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Public Provision of Employment
Services in Selected 
OECD Countries
The Job Brokerage Function
Douglas Lippoldt
Melvin Brodsky
In 2000, following a decade-long series of public employment ser-
vice reviews, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) held a conference in Prague to take stock of the con-
clusions and look forward (OECD 2001b). The final report of the
conference found that “a sea change” in public employment services’
working methods had taken place during the decade. Public employ-
ment services (PES) in many OECD countries have indeed undergone
substantial changes during the past decade as policymakers sought to
improve the effectiveness and flexibility of labor market measures in
the face of change and stress in labor markets. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a succinct, comparative review
of key developments in the public provision of employment services in
selected OECD countries, with particular emphasis on the job broker-
age function (defined broadly to include vacancy and job seeker regis-
tration, counseling and placement); reference is also made to mecha-
nisms for referral to active labor market programs. The chapter focuses
primarily on a group of OECD countries selected from among those
whose PES systems were reviewed by the OECD during the past de-
cade and for which data were available: Australia, Belgium, Denmark,
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France, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States. For an overview of the PES job brokerage
operations in each study country, see Table 7.1. It is important to note
that this selection of countries, while covering a broad range of exam-
ples, is not necessarily representative of the OECD countries as a
whole. The analysis draws substantially on OECD databases and sever-
al recent survey papers. Due to the pace of policy change in this area, it
has by necessity been illustrative rather than comprehensive in ap-
proach. 
The role of PES job brokerage services can be important in ad-
dressing market failures. First, they can help to improve the transparen-
cy of the labor market by registering and listing vacancies for job seek-
ers and employers who might not otherwise have ready access to this
information. Second, they provide tools (e.g., access to the Internet)
and assistance (e.g., advice on job search strategies) to the job-ready
unemployed and other job seekers, potentially helping them to find em-
ployment more rapidly or with a better match than might otherwise be
the case. Third, for those who are not yet job ready or who face a mis-
match vis-à-vis available vacancies, the PES can make and support re-
ferrals for training, specialized counseling or other assistance (which
may be otherwise under-supplied in the market), with a view to facili-
tating the early placement of these job seekers. Fourth, access to quali-
ty PES brokerage services can reduce the cost of job search and, in as-
sociation with benefit conditionality, can increase the job search effort
and motivation among the unemployed, thereby increasing employ-
ment probabilities and reducing unemployment.1
Although the PES play a key role in facilitating the matching of la-
bor supply and demand, they are not generally the main channel for fill-
ing vacancies.2 Typically, its market share for placements is one-third
or less (measured in terms of placements as a percentage of all hirings
in the economy; see Table 7.2).3 In an effort to improve their effective-
ness and respond to changing labor market conditions, many PES un-
dertook a restructuring of their job brokerage operations. Thus, the
1990s witnessed government action to modernize and reform PES sys-
tems by taking advantage of new technologies, empirical evidence, and
policy perspectives, thereby enhancing performance. While countries
differed in the resourcing, structure and content of their approaches,
Public Provision of Employment Services in Selected OECD Countries 213
there were also significant, common features in their restructuring
strategies. 
OVERVIEW
Already by the late 1800s or early 1900s, various types of labor ex-
changes were functioning in most, if not all, of the study countries.4
Over the decades, such exchanges were subsumed into PES systems
with activities going well beyond basic placement activities. Now, the
core PES functions generally comprise job brokerage, administration
of unemployment compensation, and administration of labor market
programs (OECD 2001b).5 In addition, the PES play an important role
in labor market information systems, both collecting some primary data
and helping to disseminate information to users including job seeker
and employer clients, among others. 
The OECD typology of labor market measures has traditionally
made a distinction between passive and active measures. The OECD
defined passive measures to include unemployment compensation and
early retirement for labor market reasons, while active measures in-
cluded PES and administration, labor market training, youth measures,
subsidized employment, and measures for the disabled. Expenditure on
passive measures tends to dominate.
In most OECD countries, some form of activation has been built
into most labor market measures, and as a consequence the effective
differences between these two categories have been reduced.6 For ex-
ample, unemployment compensation is increasingly subject to condi-
tions involving active participation in labor market programs or demon-
stration of independent initiative (OECD 2001b, pp. 35–68). This
emphasis on activation is one key influence on PES restructuring.
The resources devoted to active labor market programs (including
direct program costs and payments of subsistence allowances to pro-
gram participants, as well as PES and related administrative costs) dif-
fer greatly among the countries examined.7 In 1999, for example, Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden allocated
between 1.3 percent and 1.8 percent of their GDP to active labor market
214Table 7.1  Overview of PES Job Brokerage Operations in Selected OECD Countries
Country Description
Australia The Department for Employment and Workplace Relations is responsible for the job brokerage
function.  Placement services are provided primarily through the Job Network, which is comprised
of hundreds of agencies contracted by the Department (mainly in the private & community sectors). 
Belgium Placement and vocational training programs are primarily the responsibility of three separate regional
public agencies: FOREM, ORBEM and VDAB.   These bodies offer their services through a number
of subregional and local employment offices (as of 1997, about 100 each in Flanders and Wallonia). 
Denmark The National Labor Market Authority, working under the Ministry of Employment, provides oversight
for the job brokerage function which is implemented by the national employment service (AF).  The
public employment service is organized into 14 regional offices that direct about 95 local offices.
France The French National Employment Office (ANPE) is a national public establishment with a certain
degree of financial autonomy which is responsible for administering the job brokerage aspects of
employment services.  ANPE is organized into 22 regional offices and 750 local offices. 
Japan The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare provides oversight to the Public Employment Security
Offices (PESOs).  Supported by prefectural governments, the PESOs deliver job brokerage services
through a network of some 478 offices plus a number of branch and local offices. 
Netherlands The job brokerage service is primarily the responsibility of the Dutch Employment Office working in
co-operation with the municipalities and social partners.  Its regional offices support the delivery of
placement and reintegration services at the newly established  Centres for Work and Income that are
run on a collaborative basis.  
Sweden The National Labor Market Board (AMS) establishes general goals and guidelines for the 21 county
labor boards, which in turn are responsible for the local employment offices.  There are 403
employment offices, which operate in nearly all municipalities. 
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Switzerland The Federal Department of Economic Affairs provides policy direction for the 26 cantons, that have
substantial autonomy for implementation of the job brokerage function (through some 153 regional
placement offices). They have the option of contracting private placement agencies to provide
placement and counseling services to unemployed workers.
United Kingdom The Department for Work and Pensions provides oversight for the newly established Jobcentre Plus
which operates 1,133 local employment offices delivering job brokerage services. The operations are
relatively centralized. 
United States The US Department of Labor provides national level oversight for the PES, including the job brokerage
function.  States implement policy with considerable autonomy through a network of  roughly 2,500
local offices.  Core job placement operations must be implemented by government staff, but other
operations can be contracted out.
216Table 7.2  PES Workload and Market Share Indicators, 1999
Annual newly registered
Job seekers 








by PES as 











as a % of 
vacancies
Vacancies 
as a % of 
hirings
Placements 
as a % of 
hirings
Australiab — 8 4 — — 53 37 20
Belgiumc — — — — — — 39 —
Denmark 33 8 3 27 8 33 43 14
France 19 12 7 97
(46)
Japanb 10 9 3 113 26 29 76 23
Netherlands 13 4 3 19 17 50 28 14
Sweden 12 11 — — — — — —
Switzerland 6 4 1 12 24 37 24 9
United Kingdom — 9 5 41 — 52 44 23
United Statesd 13 5 1 27 11 26 — —
a Numbers in bold are calculated on the basis of staff in the job brokerage agency only.  The nonbold numbers, including the number in
parentheses for France, are calculated on the basis of PES-wide staffing including benefit administration but excluding staff in occupa-
tional training centers run by the PES.  
b Data for Australia and Japan refer to 1999–2000.
c Data for Belgium refer to 1995.
d Data for the United States refer to 1998–1999.
SOURCE: OECD labor market programs database, OECD PES database and, for Australian placements and vacancies, OECD (2001a).
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programs, while the United States and Japan spent 0.17 percent and
0.31 percent, respectively.8 With respect to the PES share of this active
expenditure, Martin and Grubb (2001) observe that “In 2000, the aver-
age OECD country devoted 17 per cent of active spending to PES ad-
ministration, a proportion which has been very stable over the period
1985–2000.”
Although the PES in each of the study countries delivers services in
each of the core PES functional areas, spending on the PES agencies
and related administrative costs varies widely between these countries
(see Table 7.3).9 This expenditure category includes costs of the job
brokerage function as well as the administrative costs for unemploy-
ment compensation and labor market programs.10 In 1999, the Nether-
lands and Sweden expended 0.28 percent and 0.27 percent of their
GDP, respectively, on these items. Australia, which has privatized most
of its PES activities in 1998, allocated 0.20 percent of GDP or an
amount slightly above the average for the 10 countries examined here.
The United States allocated just 0.06 percent of GDP for these expendi-
tures.
The amount of PES and related administrative expenditure per de-
pendent employee provides a comparative indication of the available
resources.11 By this measure, Australia, France, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Switzerland all expended in 1999 more than U.S.$100 per
dependent employee, while the PES in the United States expended just
U.S.$41 per dependent employee. An indication of the resource intensi-
ty of the PES can be had by comparing key results to expenditure on the
PES and related administration. For example, the PES and related ad-
ministrative costs per vacancy registered varied between U.S.$3,483 in
the Netherlands to just U.S.$632 in the United Kingdom. In relation to
each placement, these costs ranged from U.S.$6,585 in Switzerland to
U.S.$1,204 in the United Kingdom.
Staffing of the PES also varies widely, as shown by a review of the
indicators in Table 7.4. Due to a lack of consistent data, the table pres-
ents these data in two categories: those covering just the job brokerage
function and those covering the overall PES. One indicator of the poten-
tial personal service availability is the average number of dependent em-
ployees per staff member. Among the countries for which data on just
the job brokerage function are available, this indicator ranges between
365 for Sweden and 1,198 for France (ANPE, i.e., the French National
218Table 7.3  Public Employment Service Expenditures, 1999
PES and related administrative 
expenditures (in U.S. dollarsc)
Active labor market
policy expenditure 
as a % of GDPa
PES and related 
administrative expenditures 








Australiad 0.45 0.20 111 1,152 2,154
Belgium 1.34 0.18 — — —
Denmark 1.78 0.12 78 850 2,591
France 1.37 0.17 113 788 1,398
Japand 0.31 0.20 84 759 2,573
Netherlands 1.62 0.28 197 3,483 5,377
Sweden 1.81 0.27 170 1,385 —
Switzerland 0.66 0.14 115 2,440 6,585
United Kingdomd 0.36 0.13 71 632 1,204
United Statese 0.17 0.06 41 713 2,789
a The active labor market policy budget figure includes PES and administration costs, labor market training, youth measures,
subsidized employment, and measures for the disabled. (See OECD 1994a, pp. 52–53 for full definitions of expenditure cat-
egories.)
b PES and related administration costs include placement, counseling, and vocational guidance; job search courses and related
forms of intensified counseling; support of geographic mobility and similar costs; all administration costs of labor market
agencies (including unemployment benefit agencies), and other labor market programs.
c The conversion of PES expenditure data is based on market exchange rates as of July 1, 1999.
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d Expenditure data for Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom refer to 1999–2000.   For Australia and Japan, PES vacancy
and placement data refer to 1999–2000, as well.
e Data for the United States refer to 1998–1999.
SOURCE: OECD labor market programs database and OECD PES database.
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stock of job 
seekers per 
staff member
PES—Job brokerage and program management only
Denmark 95 25 454 2,775 889 48 103
France—ANPE onlyb 750 19 732 15,200 1,198 131 193
Netherlands 243 27 168 8,500 657 — 89
Sweden 403 22 1,117 10,455 365 22 41
PES—Overall, including benefit administration 
Belgiumc 123 25 248 12,300 245 48 59
Franceb — — — 37,000 570 62 93
Japan 478 27 790 15,273 3,490 70 165
Switzerlandd 153 18 270 4,483 674 25 38
United Kingdome 1,133 26 204 34,963 691 32 43
United Statesf 2,528 28 3,707 70,050 1,825 33 —
NOTE: Excludes staff in occupational training centers run by the PES.
a Data for these indicators are not available for Australia due to the privatization of PES service delivery.
b The institution in France responsible for the job brokerage function is ANPE (see Table 7.1 for a description).  The number of staff per lo-
cal office refers to 1995.  French data under “PES—Overall” include staff in ANPE, UNEDIC (unemployment benefits), Ministère du tra-
vail, and AFPA (training).




d The Swiss local office count refers to placement offices only.
e Data for average stock of job seekers per staff member in the United Kingdom are from (OECD 2001b).
f Data for the United States refer to 1998–1999 (U.S. staffing and local office numbers are estimated based on 1997 data).  Data for benefit
recipients per staff member in the United States are from (OECD 2001b).
SOURCE: OECD PES database, except as noted.
Employment Office). For the other countries, the calculation is based on
overall PES staffing data and ranges from between 245 for Belgium to
3,490 for Japan. In terms of actual client loads per staff member, Sweden
and Switzerland were the best resourced in their respective groupings,
while France (ANPE) and Japan had the largest client stocks per staff
member in their respective groupings. Despite low staffing relative to
dependent employment, the PES in the United States fell below the av-
erage for its grouping in terms of benefit recipients per staff member, re-
flecting the relatively limited use of unemployment benefits. 
ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
SERVICE PROVISION 
In each of the study countries, the PES might be thought of as a net-
work or system comprised of a number of institutions.12 National gov-
ernments have established the framework for each PES, assigning the
responsibilities for the functions of the PES to various institutional
units. Among public institutions engaged in the system, there is a divi-
sion of labor along functional lines with some responsibilities devolved
to the regional or local levels. In most of the countries, there are mech-
anisms for consultation with the social partners (i.e., employers and
worker representatives) on the functioning of the PES.13 And, increas-
ingly, there is an engagement of nongovernment organizations and oth-
er bodies in partnership arrangements with the PES, sometimes on a
contractual basis.
In 9 of the study countries, the job brokerage function is adminis-
tered under a mechanism separate from that for unemployment benefits
(Table 7.5).14 Japan is an exception in the study group, whereby a sin-
gle institution—the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare—adminis-
ters both the job brokerage and unemployment benefits functions. The
United Kingdom has restructured its system over the years first to sep-
arate, then to reintegrate the service delivery of the two functions; now,
it has moved to establish more fully integrated PES administrative
arrangements.15
The basic organization for the placement function tends to be a
tiered one consisting of a national level, regional offices, and local of-
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fices, sometimes with branch offices or part-time service windows in
other institutions. Each of the 10 study countries has at the core of its
PES a network of local offices to deliver basic placement and counsel-
ing services. However, there are many variations in the specific struc-
ture and linkages. These variations have been underscored in recent
years by differences across countries in approaches toward activation of
policy measures, introduction of new technologies, and efforts toward
improved policy coherence (among other initiatives). 
In 9 of the countries, these local offices operate under national or
regional government agencies, some of which have a fair amount of au-
tonomy.16 Australia is the exception (see “Job Network: The Australian
Case,” on p. 229) in that key placement-related services are delivered
locally for the central government on a contractual basis by private or
nonprofit providers (i.e., most basic placement services are no longer
provided directly by the state).17
A number of OECD countries have introduced or expanded decen-
tralization in service delivery, as central governments focus increasing-
ly on the policy framework and mandates and on monitoring outcomes
while permitting regional or local offices and service providers more
flexibility in implementation (OECD 2001b).18 In Denmark, this in-
volved greater engagement of the social partners in the oversight of the
PES.19 In some countries, this may involve local engagement of other
partner institutions (e.g., municipal government, educational institu-
tions, or nongovernmental organizations) with a view to expanding the
pool of knowledge and expertise in addressing labor market problems
and potentially expanding “buy-in” to agreed policy approaches (as in
some areas of the United States). 
The study countries, with the exception of Japan and the United
Kingdom, have substantially decentralized the implementation of the
placement function (Table 7.5) such that regional or local operations
can be tailored to needs in specific areas. Belgium, Switzerland, and the
United States have devolved responsibility for local PES placement of-
fices to subnational levels of government, with the result that different
office networks operate in different regions while still conforming to
the national PES frameworks.20 Under recent PES reforms that came
into effect in January 2002, the Netherlands has established centralized
oversight for the job brokerage function under the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment, but has given the local Centers for Work and
224Table 7.5  PES Placement Operations and Linkages
Separate administration of PS
and UBs?
Separate PS and UB 
local client service units?
Significant 
decentralization in 
management of local 
placement offices? Adult training provision







Belgium Yes (UBs under a national
agency, PS under regional
agencies)
Yes Yes (autonomous at
regional level)
Most is provided by the
regional PES agencies.
Denmark Yes (UBs through autonomous
funds, PS through national
agency)
No, in practice (i.e., most
clients register for UBs at
PS office, but separate UI




Most is purchased from a
PES institution, some
externally.a
France Yes (UBs through  autonomous
funds under social partners,
PS through a national
agency)




Most is purchased ex-
ternally or  provided via
a government supported
association (AFPA).
Japan No (both under Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare)
No (but separate ES and UI
sections within offices)




Netherlands Yes (UBs through industrial
insurance boards & joint
bodies, PS through national
agency & partners)
Yes, but moving to co-
locate services with one-





local Centres of Work
and Income)
Most is purchased ex-
ternally.a
Sweden Yes (UBs through autonomous
funds & municipalities, PS
through national agency)
No (claims handled usually




Most is purchased ex-
ternally.
Switzerland Yes (although both under 
same federal department,




Yes Yes (semi-autonomous at
the canton level)
Most is purchased ex-
ternally, with some
provided through PES &
its partners.
United Kingdom Implementing a merged system Generally no, with some
variation by locality (but
implementing a merged
system)
Limited Most is provided through
PS referral to an external
partner institution
(Learning &  Skills
Council).






Mixed (there is a national
initiative for one-stop
shops, but some state
variation; e.g., UB tele-
phone/internet initial




NOTE: PS = Placement service; UB = unemployment benefit.
a In these countries (Australia 1999–2000, Denmark 2000, Netherlands 2000, United States 1998–1999), adult training was the largest
ALMP category in terms of participant inflows (excluding PS).
SOURCE: PES Internet sites and OECD PES reviews; OECD 1993a,b; 1996a,b,c; 1997; 1999; 2001a.
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Income a degree of independence in management and mandated “inte-
grated co-operation” with similar departments in the municipalities
(Struyven and Steurs 2002).
As a complement to the network of local placement offices, some
countries have set up separate PES offices for special target groups. For
example, in France, special local units have been set up to place and
counsel youth (espaces jeunes), professionals (espaces cadres), or em-
ployees in specific industries.21 In Belgium, each of the three regional
placement agencies runs separate (for profit) offices for placements into
temporary work. In Japan, the work of the main PES offices is bolstered
by satellite branch and local offices set up to serve particular local areas
or client groups (e.g., students, part-time workers, women with chil-
dren) (Ministry of Labour 1995).22
Provider networks extend well beyond the local offices in the study
countries and are used to address job seeker needs beyond the basic
placement, counseling, and unemployment benefit services. Placement
offices refer individuals to active labor market programs or to other ser-
vice providers addressing special needs (e.g., to respond to psychologi-
cal problems). While subsidized employment programs are often ad-
ministered directly through the placement offices, most of the other
programs and measures are operated through PES partners or contrac-
tors. For example, in most if not all of the study countries (Belgium
may remain an exception), training referrals are generally made to out-
side providers (Table 7.5). This is the case even in those countries that
20 years ago may have relied more on state-run training centers (e.g.,
Netherlands or Sweden). The use of networks of providers enables the
PES to provide individuals with access to a broad range of targeted as-
sistance.
Even though placement services are often administered separately
from unemployment benefits and program services, there is nevertheless
a move toward functional integration across providers. This is seen, in
part, as a means of rendering the system more transparent to users and
more capable of capitalizing on synergies between the various services
available in an area. In some cases, this has involved actual co-location
of placement services and registration for unemployment benefits, as in
Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands (now being implemented), Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States (some areas). In others, it has
involved “virtual” links, as in some areas of the United States.
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A broader approach can be seen in the ongoing implementation of
one-stop shop facilities in countries such as the Netherlands and much
of the United States.23 While the exact definition of one-stop shops
varies by country, these offices are generally structured to include a lo-
cal employment center at their core (providing placement services,
counseling, and referral to programs), plus unemployment benefit ad-
ministration and representation of other partners such as government
agencies, nonprofit organizations, educational institutions or private-
sector firms. One-stop shops sometimes take the form of unified intake
points for labor market and social services provided by different agen-
cies or suppliers; sometimes they are even more ambitious, with a co-
location of service delivery.
Another organizational development in the PES structure of sever-
al of the study countries is the increase in contestability of employ-
ment services. Australia has perhaps gone the furthest in this regard,
maintaining a public vacancy and resume database system, but deliver-
ing most other labor exchange and reintegration services through pri-
vate providers (see “Job Network: The Australian Case,” on p. 229).
The Netherlands has gone part of the way down this pioneering path
by moving toward contestability in the delivery of reintegration ser-
vices (Struyven and Steurs 2002). On the other hand, most OECD
countries have introduced contestability in the delivery of at least a
portion of their long-term training (Table 7.5). In a twist on the theme
of contestability, the Swiss system has introduced performance-related
payments to the cantons, which have management responsibility for
the local public providers. Moreover, treatment of private employ-
ment services has been liberalized in many OECD countries, even
those that formerly maintained a monopoly for the PES (e.g., Den-
mark). In sum, the employment services market has become much
more competitive.
In 1997, a new International Labour Office convention (C 181) rec-
ognized that private employment services could contribute to the
healthy functioning of labor markets and advocated PES cooperation
with them, while still envisaging regulation to prevent abuses (Thuy,
Hansen, and Price 2001).24 This reflected the (sometimes newly devel-
oped) thinking in most OECD countries that such agencies could com-
plement the PES. In all of the study countries, private employment ser-
vices now play a significant role. For example, in the United States
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there are over 31,000 private employment agencies that offer labor ex-
change services (Balducchi and Pasternak 2001). 
The shift to decentralized systems with networks of providers 
and functional integration across core PES activities has been helped 
by new technologies and management information systems. Office
automation and communication
technology has expanded the pos-
sibilities for exchange of informa-
tion concerning labor market con-
ditions (supply, demand, wages),
job seekers, and employers (e.g.,
resumes and vacancies), or pro-
gram administration (within the
bounds of privacy constraints on
sharing of client information).
While potentially benefiting all
labor market participants, these
systems play a critical role in the
operation of the PES. The infor-
mation they generate empowers
PES managers with timely infor-
mation on local conditions and the
performance of their offices. The
information also feeds back into
the policy and budget formation
processes. For example, local per-
formance is taken into account in
the contracting process in Aus-
tralia and the determination of
central budget funding for PES
operations in Swiss cantons. A
number of other OECD countries
(e.g., Sweden, the United King-
dom, and the United States) have
invested in developing perfor-
mance measurement systems that
provide incentives for managers
JOB NETWORK:
THE AUSTRALIAN CASE
In recent years, the Australian gov-
ernment has energetically pushed forward
with far-ranging employment service re-
forms that extend and combine a number
of the innovations discussed above.  In
particular, major PES reforms were im-
plemented from 1998, whereby the for-
mer Commonwealth Employment Ser-
vice was shut down and most labor
market programs and the previous case
management system were abolished.  The
government established a new system de-
pending substantially on contracted ser-
vice providers.  
Centrelink, a single point of initial
contact for job seekers, was established
for individuals wishing to access income
support and employment services (as well
as certain other government benefits and
services).  This government-sponsored
service provider operates under a busi-
ness partnership arrangement funded by
several government agencies.  At intake,
it employs a “job seeker classification in-
strument” to profile clients and—together
with other criteria—determine the level
and types of assistance that can be of-
fered.
Centrelink refers eligible job seekers
(primarily the unemployed and new or
reentrants to the labor market) to the Job
Network, which consists of hundreds 
of competitively contracted service pro-
to deliver outcomes and satisfy
their clients. 
CLIENT FLOWS: FINDING 
A JOB
The OECD publication La-
bour Market Policies for the 1990s
laid out a labor market policy
agenda highlighting three priori-
ties: 1) mobilizing labor supply, 2)
developing employment related
skills, and 3) promotion of a spirit
of active search among job seek-
ers. Service provision was to focus
first on steps that would rapidly act
to motivate the job seeker while
increasing the individual’s search
efforts and job readiness. The
more intensive measures were to
be reserved for later in the period
of job search, to be made available
only if the first round of services
failed. This agenda was affirmed
in 1992, when OECD labor minis-
ters endorsed a “long-term strate-
gy for a progressive shift from pas-
sive to active labor market
measures and related social poli-
cies.” (OECD 2001c). Subsequent
OECD reviews of the PES ap-
proaches to client flows indicate
that many have substantially fol-
lowed through in the implementa-
tion of such a strategy.
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viders.  They deliver the bulk of govern-
ment-funded employment services, in-
cluding placement services, through five
principal measures:
1) Job Matching (basic labor ex-
change services),
2) Job Search Training (JST, selected
off the shelf assistance and coun-
seling delivered according to an
agreed job search skill plan),
3) Intensive Assistance (IA, substan-
tial personalized assistance deliv-
ered according to a negotiated
preparing for work agreement),
4) Project Contracting (seasonal
placement services), and
5) New Enterprise Incentive Scheme
(self-employment development).
In addition, job seekers with special
needs such as severely disabled, youth
and indigenous people can be referred to
other measures operated by a variety of
public agencies.
Technology is widely employed for
the administration of the system and the
delivery of services.  A user-friendly va-
cancy database is available and accessible
via the Internet and touch-screen kiosks
in Centrelink offices and other locations.
Employers can list open vacancies direct-
ly via the Internet (i.e., with full infor-
mation accessible to all job seekers) or 
in a semi-open fashion via the Job Net-
work providers (i.e., employer informa-
tion is not available until the job seeker
registers with the provider).  Listings via
the Job Network are generally (but not al-
ways) semi-open, because providers are
paid a fee for placing qualified job seek-
ers and want to retain the business for
themselves.  Contracted service providers
submit administrative information and
Is the Future PES a “Virtual”
Institution?
In terms of organization, the
development of the Internet has
transformed many PES into “vir-
tual” institutions that are accessi-
ble from any computer with Inter-
net access. While PES maintain
“bricks and mortar” office net-
works, their virtual services can
decouple the job-matching pro-
cess from the physical confines of
the employment office. PES agen-
cies also use the Internet to deliver
practical information to job seek-
ers on topics such as job search,
how to apply for a job, training op-
portunities, labor market informa-
tion, benefit entitlements, or addi-
tional services available to clients
in their facilities. In some cases,
job seekers can request via the In-
ternet e-mail notification of vacan-
cies that match their preferences
or they can post their resumes for
review by perspective employers;
or registered employers can list
their vacancies directly over the
Internet (e.g., in Australia, Swe-
den, and the United States). 
However, it is clear that the
use of the Internet has limitations.
Disadvantaged job seekers, for
example, may not have ready ac-
cess to a computer with Internet
access or may not have the skills
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track their contractual arrangements on
line.
As part of the reforms, income sup-
port measures were further activated with
mutual obligation requirements imposed
for younger unemployed (and the middle-
aged, ≤ 49 years of age) and Work for the
Dole activities (delivered via contracted
providers separate from the Job Network
and generally targeting young benefit re-
cipients after six months on benefit, but
also often taken up by other unemployed).
The number of unemployment benefit
sanctions increased significantly as a con-
sequence of the activation requirements,
with many sanctions linked to a failure to
attend measures (e.g., IA).
A recent OECD review of Australian
labor market policies (2001a) found that
the results of the first years of Job Network
operation were mixed.  Job seeker and em-
ployer satisfaction surveys indicate that
clients of the new system were generally
happy with it.  Placement results were
comparable to the previous system (e.g.,
in terms of market share) and, more re-
cently, improving.  Moreover, these re-
sults were achieved at significantly less
cost.  However, it was not clear that oppor-
tunities to serve the disadvantaged were
fully exploited.  For example, a substantial
number of IA participants reported that
they had little contact with their providers
after the first or second visit.  Another con-
cern was the integration of the various ele-
ments of the system, particularly with re-
spect to the very long-term unemployed.
As individuals are serviced by different el-
ements of the system over time, expertise
on their cases may be lost and thus their
needs may not be systematically treated.
Efforts are under way to address such
shortfalls. Source: OECD (2001a)
to use the services effectively. Highly qualified job seekers also may
need advice or information that is most efficiently delivered via an em-
ployment center with trained job counselors and ready access to refer-
ence tools and guidance materials. Thus, even where vacancy listings
are readily accessible, many job seekers continue to approach the PES
for additional information or services. For example in Belgium (Flan-
ders), although more than 90 percent of registered vacancies are adver-
tised on a fully open basis, direct referrals by employment counselors
account for a quarter to a third of the job applications that are made in
response to registered vacancies (OECD 2001b).
In sum, it appears that the employment office still has a critical role
to play in the PES organization. However, even in this regard, technolo-
gy is playing an increasing role. Employment services in many OECD
countries are tending to promote the primary responsibility of individual
job seekers for their own job search. In order to allocate scarce resources
with a view to targeting the most intensive services on those most in
need, the PES are increasingly relying on self-service approaches to de-
liver at least a portion of their services to other job seekers. 
Self-Service Initiatives and Job Seeker Access to 
Vacancy Listings 
While a primary focus of PES systems is to facilitate reemploy-
ment of the unemployed, all of the study countries make at least some
basic job placement services available to all job seekers, including em-
ployed individuals seeking a change of employment. Generally, this in-
cludes access to information from a national job vacancy database. 
In many countries, job seekers can gain access to searchable vacan-
cy listings of the PES even without registering. Where employer infor-
mation is provided in at least some of the vacancy listings (i.e., vacancy
listings are open), as in Australia, Belgium, France, Sweden, or the
United States, the job seeker can find a job match directly. The PES in
countries as diverse as Singapore and Slovenia have moved to post
open vacancies on the Internet. Similar initiatives have been undertaken
by private firms such as TMP (which operates Monster.com). And,
some PES Web sites provide links to such commercial vacancy listings
(e.g., as in the United Kingdom). Overall, the advent of the searchable
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vacancy listing has enhanced the transparency of the labor market, po-
tentially expediting the job-matching process. 
Where such services are sought by job seekers who face no partic-
ular disadvantage on the labor market, the PES tend to emphasize self-
service approaches. While the Internet is a key part of this strategy, job
seekers are also able to access a broad range of tools at local placement
offices. For example, some PES provide access to desktop computers or
reference materials. Japan is currently setting up “Hello Work Informa-
tion Plazas” as a way of providing a range of employment information
to job seekers. France has developed a computerized system of refer-
ences and descriptions of occupations and required skills. Touch-screen
kiosks are also widely employed in OECD countries (e.g., Australia,
Belgium, Sweden, and some U.S. states), powered by intuitive software
to assist job seekers—even to those who are not computer literate—
with easy access to vacancies and other information. 
In some of the study countries, many vacancies remain listed in a
semi-open fashion by the PES. Although countries such as Australia or
the United Kingdom have Internet-accessible vacancy databases, em-
ployer information is often not provided (i.e., such vacancy listings are
semi-open). This forces job seekers to contact the employment office
for details. The use of semi-open vacancy listings and employment of-
fice contacts can facilitate prescreening of potential applicants (e.g., as 
a service to employers), monitoring of the PES effectiveness and, in 
the case of Australia, tracking the delivery of contracted services by
suppliers.
Job Seeker Registration
Unemployment benefit claimants are generally required to register
as job seekers at a PES placement office as a precondition for benefit
payment (OECD 2001b, pp. 35–68).25 Registration is also generally re-
quired of other individuals seeking more intensive forms of assistance.
While all of the study countries encourage early placements of unem-
ployed who are job ready, only about one-third of OECD countries
“positively affirm that the placement service sometimes attempts place-
ment at the initial registration.” Following the first registration contact,
most countries conduct a detailed registration interview that may fol-
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low a week or more afterwards. Among other functions, the PES may
use this process to promote self-service job search, or in some cases to
establish individual action plans (e.g., in Australia, Belgium, France,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).
Subsequently, for benefit recipients, regular signing-on or confir-
mation of status is required in most OECD countries as a condition of
benefit receipt (OECD 2001b, pp. 35–68). Australia, Belgium, Japan,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom require in-per-
son visits, whereas in Denmark, France, Sweden, and some areas of the
United States, this is done by mail.26 In Australia, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, these proce-
dures involve reporting on job-search efforts, but in Denmark, France,
and Sweden, job search is reviewed relatively infrequently. In Belgium,
there are no general procedures for reporting on job search. Research
reported by Martin and Grubb (2001) found that countries whose PES
effectively monitors unemployment insurance claimants’ search for
work can reduce the duration of unemployment and unemployment in-
surance payments.27
In seeking to improve the functioning of labor markets, the PES of-
ten take special initiatives to address the needs of those job seekers fac-
ing particular disadvantages. For example, this might include targeting
special initiatives on groups such as the long-term unemployed (a sub-
stantial share of total unemployment in most of the study countries) or
youth. Or, for example, in a few countries those with low educational at-
tainment are targeted.28Youth and those with low educational attainment
both experience above-average rates of unemployment (see Table 7.6).
Early in the registration process, Australia, the Netherlands, and the
United States use profiling to identify those likely to require and bene-
fit from intervention with more intensive assistance to address employ-
ment-related issues early in spells of unemployment.29 Some countries
use categorical targeting to respond to the needs of “at risk” groups,
such as youth and young adults (e.g., Australia’s Mutual Obligation ini-
tiative); others classify the unemployed into groups according to their
placement prospects, but rely on the judgement of the PES officers to
do so (e.g., Sweden and Switzerland).
As Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) note, “the experience of
unemployment has an adverse effect on search effectiveness.” Conse-









































Australiab 7.0 29.4 8.4 13.5 7,701 2.2 742 397
Belgiumb 8.6 60.5 12.0 22.6 3,015 1.1 149 109
Denmark 4.8 20.5 7.0 10.0 2,468 1.8 227 74
Francec 10.7 40.4 15.3 26.5 21,079 3.1 3,031 1,710
Japan 4.7 22.4 5.6 9.3 53,305 1.2 5,862 1,730
Netherlands 3.2 43.5 4.9 7.4 5,581 1.7 315 204
Sweden 7.2 30.1 9.0 14.2 3,816 — 468 —
Switzerland 3.0 39.6 5.0 5.6 3,020 1.7 143 53
United Kingdom 5.9 29.6 10.0 12.3 24,172 2.2 2,724 1,430
United Statesb 4.2 6.8 7.7 9.9 127,842 — 7,372 1,886
a Long-term unemployment refers to spells of 12 months or more.
b Dependent employment, hiring rate, total vacancies notified and PES placements data refer to 2000 for Australia, 1995 for Belgium and
1998 for the United States.  
c For France, the hiring rate is based on data for the private sector only.
SOURCE: Unemployment rates are from the OECD (2002), except for those with less than upper secondary education, which are from OECD
(2001c). Entries for other items are from the OECD PES database.
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quently, as durations of unemployment spells increase, many PES
agencies take the initiative to suggest that job seekers should apply for
a specific vacancy; in effect, they imply an obligation to attend a job in-
terview with an employer (e.g., Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States). While most PES target
additional assistance on the long-term unemployed to promote job
readiness and motivation for job search, the United Kingdom has
adopted a work first approach that more aggressively seeks to place in-
dividuals into employment as soon as possible, even while seeking to
address any potential impediments to successful labor market experi-
ences (Wells 2001). Both obligations to interview and placements into
temporary employment help job seekers to maintain some contact with
the labor market, which can provide them insights into possibilities for
finding a job.
Alternatively, the PES may seek to place job seekers into active la-
bor market programs as their job search lengthens. Countries such as
Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, or the
United Kingdom have used preestablished durations as triggers for re-
ferral of clients to such programs. In the Netherlands, for example,
about half of the unemployed are likely to be placed in a program after
12 months on the job seeker register (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001). In
many cases, employment counselors have some discretion and may use
other criteria in making referrals. Some programs are also open to job
seekers who voluntarily request admission as a way of improving their
job prospects. In Denmark and Sweden, upgrading workforce skills is
an integral part of the PES remit, and there is relatively open access to
training programs. 
Vacancy Registration and Employer Services
While employers in some OECD countries increasingly register
their vacancies directly via the Internet, local employment offices still
strive to maintain direct contact with employers. This allows counselors
to cultivate an understanding of the local labor market and to increase
employer awareness of additional services available through the PES
beyond the basic vacancy listings (e.g., prescreening of candidates or
tailored training). New resume talent banks enable employers in some
countries to search actively for suitable job applicants, including direct-
236 Lippoldt and Brodsky
ly via the Internet (e.g., Sweden and the United States). In some cases,
the PES has sought to market fee-for-services options to employers
along with the basic free provision of the core job brokerage services
(e.g., in Belgium).
Vacancy registrations are for the most part voluntary. A few coun-
tries require employers to list their vacancies with the PES (Belgium
and Sweden), but this is rarely enforced. The French ANPE includes in
its vacancy listings not only those vacancies about which it has been di-
rectly notified, but also vacancies advertised in newspapers and maga-
zines. The Danish PES also registers job announcements placed by em-
ployers in newspapers. 
A study by de Koning, Denys, and Walwei (1999) found the PES to
be a very important recruitment tool for employers because it provides
a ready source of available workers and is free of charge. The PES in
the examined countries have employed a variety of strategies to in-
crease the number of registered vacancies. Some countries (including
Belgium, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom) have organized mar-
keting campaigns to get employers to increase vacancy notifications. In
the United Kingdom, the PES has appointed specific officers as account
managers to manage the PES relationship with particular firms. In Swe-
den, every employer has one counselor as a point of contact (about 150
employers per counselor). Counselors are expected to spend 15–20 per-
cent of their time visiting employers. In Belgium (Wallonia), the PES
has established units to conduct vacancy searches. In Denmark, ap-
proximately 30–40 percent of PES staff are required to keep in contin-
uous contact with employers, and their performance in listing vacancies
is systematically evaluated (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001).
PES PERFORMANCE
Goals and Objectives
The study countries employ a variety of management tools to pro-
vide policy direction and results-orientation in the work of the PES,
with goals and objectives set through different channels depending on
institutional arrangements. Implementation is monitored through PES
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performance indicators and management information systems. Fulfill-
ment is assessed through a variety of strategies, such as external evalu-
ations and audits or client satisfaction surveys.30 For example:
• The Australian labor market reforms launched in 1998 incorpo-
rated provisions for a three stage evaluation (including an ele-
ment of external evaluation) focused on four key criteria: 1) ef-
fectiveness, 2) efficiency, 3) quality of service, and 4) equity.
The elaboration of these criteria helped to provide direction for
the PES and its service providers (whose contracts were speci-
fied with these criteria in mind). 
• In Denmark, local PES management contracts with each em-
ployee or team with regard to annual resources and targets. Re-
gional offices also have agreements with local offices and with
the National Labor Market Board. 
• In France, a Contrat de Progres agreement between the ANPE
and the Ministries of Labor and Finance sets the direction of the
agency for a four-year period. The agreement contains a number
of qualitative targets, such as widening the range of services,
fighting social exclusion, and decentralizing budget manage-
ment.31 A tableaux de bord report provides monthly information
for managers on the PES results for the regions and the country
as a whole. 
• The Netherlands sets the total number of placements as its main
goal but differentiates between placements in regular jobs versus
subsidized jobs, and direct placements made by job centers ver-
sus indirect placements made by other public institutions such as
local community organizations cooperating with job centers. 
• The Swedish PES uses four indicators to measure PES success:
1) rate of filling vacancies; 2) proportion of previously unem-
ployed persons as part of total hiring; 3) the vacancy registration
rate; and 4) the job seeker registration rate. A computerized
management information system called “Leda” displays opera-
tional targets for various levels and organizations of the PES on
an annual, quarterly and monthly basis. Access to the system is
open to all PES employees.
• Switzerland has recently implemented a system to measure the
placement performance of local employment offices in terms of
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the average duration of job search, the proportion of unemploy-
ment spells which result in benefit exhaustion, and the propor-
tion of unemployed workers who reregister after leaving the un-
employment rolls (OECD 2001b). 
• In the United Kingdom, a recent employment service annual
performance agreement lists performance requirements and tar-
gets for six major elements (Mosley, Schütz, and Breyer 2001).
For example, the PES aims to offer unemployed people, particu-
larly the long-term unemployed and other disadvantaged people,
help and advice in finding work or appropriate training. Its ef-
fectiveness is measured in terms of such absolute figures as the
total number of vacancy registrations and the total number of
placements. In addition, the government hires an independent
research company to survey the PES performance at local job
centers. 
• In the United States, the evaluation system for the PES consists
of three components: 1) a set of labor exchange performance
measures (e.g., job seeker entered-employment rate and employ-
ment retention rate at six months); 2) reporting requirements for
labor exchange services and outcomes; and 3) procedures for es-
tablishing performance goals that state agencies and the U.S.
Department of Labor can use in assuring the quality of labor ex-
change services (U.S. Department of Labor 2001). 
• In addition, in recent years the PES in a number of the OECD
countries have placed more emphasis on how PES customers
(i.e., employers and job seekers) rate the services they have been
receiving from the PES. This customer service orientation has
been reinforced in some countries, such as Australia, Belgium
(VDAB), France, Sweden,32 the United Kingdom, and the Unit-
ed States through the use of client satisfaction surveys. 
Comparative Review of PES Performance
International comparisons of PES performance indicators can help
to provide a rough appreciation of PES outcomes. However, care must
be taken in drawing any conclusions due to the important influences of
specific national contexts. 
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Market share indicators can help to situate PES performance in the
labor market. Examples include PES vacancy listings as a percentage
of all hirings in the economy, and PES placements as a percentage of all
hirings in the economy (Table 7.2). Among the countries examined, the
Japanese PES reported the highest percentage of registered vacancies
relative to hirings. The PES in Japan and the United Kingdom delivered
the highest percentages of placements relative to hirings. Switzerland
delivered the lowest market share results in these two indicators (24
percent and 9 percent, respectively).33
In terms of internal performance, the ability of the PES to place job
seekers into vacancies is regarded as one of the most important factors.
An indicator for PES placements as a percentage of new job seeker reg-
istrations with the PES, which can sometimes be readily calculated
from PES reporting, provides a rough gauge of performance in this
area. Table 7.2 shows the wide range in this indicator for the study
countries, which range from 8 percent in Denmark and 11 percent in
the United States, to 34 percent in France and 26 percent in Japan.
The number of placements per PES staff member provides a rough
indicator of the labor intensity of one aspect of the PES operations.34
Here again, there is wide variation. In 1999, among countries for which
the basis of the calculation was PES-wide staffing, this indicator ranged
from 113 placements per staff member in Japan to 12 placements in
Switzerland.35 Among the countries for which the calculation was
based on job brokerage agency staff only, it ranged from 97 in France to
19 in the Netherlands.
When comparing the data on placements, the following caveats
should be kept in mind. First, the number of placements says nothing
about the quality of the job or the labor market readiness of the job
seeker. It is much more difficult to place someone from a disadvantaged
labor market group in a well-paid job than it is to place a highly quali-
fied applicant into a temporary job. Second, PES placements are diffi-
cult to measure. For example, many PES placements achieved through
self-service or general PES job search assistance are not easily tracked.
Third, PES placements are sometimes not well defined or properly
recorded.36 Moreover, while the PES takes credit for many placements,
job seekers often do not recognize the PES as the main reason for find-
ing a job.37
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Effectiveness of PES Placement-Related Programs
The OECD has actively reviewed the growing evaluation literature
on placement-related programs (among other areas). The evidence,
while not without qualification, indicates positive findings with respect
to several approaches that help to support and motivate active job
search:
• Job-search assistance38 tends to be viewed as an effective and in-
expensive way of getting the unemployed back to work quick-
ly.39
• Efforts to maintain closer contacts with unemployed workers
through an intensified interview process can help to motivate job
search.40
• Compulsory referral of job seekers to labor market programs af-
ter a specified period in unemployment has been effective in re-
ducing unemployment.41
• Tightening unemployment benefit eligibility requirements and
increasing their enforcement (along with increased monitoring
of job search) have been found to help motivate effective job
search.42
As for active labor market programs that go beyond job-search as-
sistance, the literature has tended to indicate that large-scale public em-
ployment programs deliver the least positive postprogram effects.43
Training programs and recruitment incentives to the private sector fall
somewhere in the midrange between job search assistance and public
employment programs, with their success depending largely on design
characteristics and the type of target groups addressed (Schwanse
2001).
CONCLUSION
This chapter has underscored current approaches to implementa-
tion of the PES job brokerage function in 10 OECD countries. While
there is wide variation in the resourcing, structure, and content of the
various approaches, there are some crosscutting themes and principles
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that have emerged as part of efforts to improve the effectiveness of the
PES. These touch on the following aspects of PES operations:
• Institutional structure: emphasizing decentralization and net-
working among service providers, combined with functional in-
tegration in the field operations. 
• Delivery of job brokerage services: emphasizing contestability
through the liberalization of private employment services, in-
creasing competitive contracting of services by the PES, and
performance monitoring of service delivery within the PES.
• Service delivery: emphasizing customer service orientation.
• Reemployment strategies: emphasizing job search and activation
measures, while targeting or tiering more intensive services on
disadvantaged job seekers.
• New information technologies: emphasizing delivery of infor-
mation over the Internet, self-service approaches, and manage-
ment information systems.
While OECD countries have found that diversity in approach is ap-
propriate in view of the differing national contexts, experience in many
has highlighted the common utility of certain of these recent innova-
tions.
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1. See Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) for a useful discussion of job search and
unemployment.
2. In many labor markets, the PES market share for placements is smaller than such
channels as newspaper advertisements, direct application to employers, or con-
tacts through personal networks. 
3. For example, figures from the European Commission indicate that the PES in Eu-
ropean Union member states intervene in between 10 percent and 30 percent of
total hiring, although the number of unemployed people receiving help from the
PES in finding employment is higher (European Commission 1998).
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4. Janoski (1990) and OECD (1999), for example, provide information on the ori-
gins of employment services in the United States and certain other OECD coun-
tries.
5. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, the PES have a regulatory or legal
oversight role (e.g., related to dismissal procedures or work permits).
6. Among policymakers in most OECD countries, activation had already become an
important theme by 1990 (e.g., see OECD 1990).
7. See the notes to Table 7.4 for an explanation of these terms. 
8. One factor contributing to this divergence is the prevalence of long-term unem-
ployment (defined as spells of 12 months or more, see Table 7.2) in certain Euro-
pean countries and their use of active labor market programs to address the prob-
lem. It is interesting to note that among the study countries, Sweden tended to
devote the highest share of its overall labor market program expenditure to active
measures (more than one-half in 1993 and 1998), whereas most of the other study
countries expended between one-fifth and two-fifths of the total on active spend-
ing during these two years (OECD 2001c, p. 24).
9. In the Netherlands, for example, the share of GDP spent on these costs was more
than seven times greater than the share in the United States.
10. To the extent that this expenditure category also includes the administrative costs
related to unemployment benefits (but not the cost of unemployment benefits
themselves), it is not a “purely” active category. 
11. Dependent employment refers essentially to wage and salary jobholders.
12. There is some debate about the importance of PES institutional issues. de Koning
(2001), for example, argues that OECD governments have tended to “overesti-
mate the role of the institutional framework,” but also acknowledges that “organ-
isation and implementation of active policies matter to outcomes.” An ILO survey
of the PES around the world (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001) found that most of
the well-established PES had been through a phase whereby a standardized and
structured set of services, procedures, and processes were the norm throughout lo-
cal offices. The authors observe a broad “recognition that a standardized organi-
zation fails to produce the desired results” and note a broad shift internationally
“toward a more flexible and decentralized service-delivery approach tailored to
the conditions and needs of local areas.”
13. In about half the countries, the social partners (i.e., employers representatives and
unions), or the unions alone, participate in the actual administration of benefits
(e.g., France or Sweden). But, with respect to the labor exchange function, their
role tends to be advisory.
14. This is one area where bias is evident in the selection of countries for the present
study. The share of OECD countries with fully integrated systems is higher than
10 percent. Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Korea, and Norway have fully inte-
grated systems.
15. At the local office level in the United Kingdom, the delivery of employment ser-
vices and unemployment benefits has been reunited for about a decade. Now, ad-
ministrative operations of the former Employment Service and certain elements
from the former Benefits Agency (including some benefits in addition to unem-
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ployment benefits) are being merged under the new Jobcentres Plus service in the
Department for Work and Pensions.
16. For example, state offices in the United States have a fair amount of autonomy to
innovate within the federal framework or, in France, ANPE has a fair degree of
autonomy governed in part by the contrat de progrès agreement with the govern-
ment.
17. Interestingly, the United States has taken the opposite position. Despite the heavy
use of contracted services in some PES areas such as training, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor insists that basic placement services must be delivered by govern-
ment personnel (as a way of ensuring that these basic services are delivered to job
seekers in an objective fashion).
18. By the early 1990s, a number of OECD countries were already applying decen-
tralization in service delivery (e.g., the Netherlands and the United States). Still,
even where decentralization already existed, often new means of implementing it
were applied during the course of the 1990s.
19. In another example, Austria shifted a substantial share of implementation discre-
tion to the regional and local offices, with greater engagement of the social part-
ners in oversight. The Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom abandoned
tripartite approaches in 1994, 1991, and 1987, respectively. 
20. Canada has also substantially decentralized its placement services, transferring
nearly all of the resources and responsibilities for this function from the federal to
the provincial level.
21. For example, this occurs under “conversion agreements” with companies to pro-
vide services to employees being laid off.
22. Japanese secondary school students are served primarily by the PES, whereas
university students are served by their school guidance/placement services
(http://www2.mhlw.go.jp/english/e_text/outline/02-5.htm).
23. In France, “single window” facilities exist for access to a range of services for
certain client groups (e.g., some facilities target youth or professionals), but they
do not integrate unemployment benefits. Australia has unified unemployment
benefit administration with job brokerage intake; delivery of job brokerage ser-
vices remains separate (see “Job Network: The Australian Case,” on p. 229).
24. The ILO previously sought to restrict such agencies via Convention 96.
25. There are some exceptions, such as benefit claimants in the United States who are
temporarily laid off with a specific recall date.
26. In some parts of the United States, such as Wisconsin, benefit claimants confirm
their status via telephone.
27. Chapter 5 in this volume by Christopher O’Leary underscores importance of
monitoring and verifying active work search by UI claimants. Also, a useful sum-
mary of PES administration of the work test can be found in (Thuy, Hansen, and
Price 2001).
28. For example, measures targeted on those with low educational attainment exist in
Belgium (via individual action plans) and France (Contrat Jeunes).
29. See Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer (2002) for an overview on the statistical
models of UI benefit exhaustion used by U.S. states in Worker Profiling and
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Reemployment Services systems for targeting of early reemployment services on
those at greatest risk of long term UI benefit receipt. 
30. For a discussion of approaches, see Mosley, Schütz, and Breyer (2001) and Wal-
wei (1997).
31. The 1999–2003 agreement emphasizes modernization of the ANPE, integrating
of youth into the labor market, and reducing long-term unemployment.
32. In 1998 and 1999 the Swedish National Labor Market Board promoted customer
satisfaction as a PES goal. However, this indicator was dropped at the national
level in the year 2000 in order to simplify the performance management system
and to concentrate PES work on reducing the unemployment rate to 4 percent by
the end of the year 2000 (Mosley, Schütz, and Breyer 2001). Local employment
offices continue to carry out their own client interview surveys as a basis for local
operations’ planning.
33. In the United States, Holzer (1998) reports that PES agencies account for about 3
percent of newly hired workers in all jobs.
34. The use of placement indicators must be taken in the national context, controlling
for a variety of factors (discussed below).
35. The PES in Japan has a well-developed self-service information system that has
operated for a number of years. The use of this system and related self-service
tools is well established and may account partly for the low labor intensity of its
PES operations (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001).
36. For example, repeated short-term placements of a relatively small proportion of
job seekers are sometimes found to account for a large proportion of all place-
ments, or local offices are sometimes found to be recording placements in situa-
tions where they did not really achieve the match (e.g., in cases of recall follow-
ing a temporary layoff or where the employer has applied for a hiring subsidy to
be granted in respect of a specific candidate who was not identified with PES as-
sistance).
37. For example, the Swedish National Labor Market Board (AMS) asked workers
who had been hired during 1992 and 1993 where they received the decisive infor-
mation about these jobs (OECD 1996b). The proportion mentioning the PES was
13–14 percent. Yet a review of PES job placements as a percentage of vacancy
registrations using AMS data implies that the PES was in part responsible for 47
percent of job placements.
38. Job search assistance is a term covering a variety of relatively low-cost and gen-
erally short-term services aimed at equipping and motivating job seekers to find a
job. Examples include initial interviews at PES offices, in-depth counseling dur-
ing an unemployment spell, reemployment bonuses, and jobs clubs (Martin and
Grubb 2001). Such services are also sometimes combined with increased moni-
toring and enforcement of the job search requirements for receipt of unemploy-
ment benefits.
39. For example, Martin and Grubb (2001) report that evaluations in Canada, Swe-
den, the United Kingdom, and the United States support this finding, although a
study in the Netherlands found no significant impact.
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40. For example, the OECD Jobs Study (OECD 1994b) found that increased PES ef-
forts to maintain closer contacts with the unemployed through frequent job inter-
views was effective, and that interviewing unemployed people, when such a pro-
cedure was rarely used before, resulted in 5–10 percent of benefit claims being
dropped. In the Netherlands, employment counselors who increased the amount
of time spent interviewing the unemployed found an almost one-third increase in
the number of job applications.
41. For example, evaluations in Denmark and Switzerland found that establishing an
obligation to enter a labor market program increased the rate at which the unem-
ployed found a job.
42. For example, Abbring, Van Den Berg, and Van Ours (1999) found that imposing
benefit sanctions on the unemployed in the Netherlands raised their subsequent
transition rate to employment by 77 percent in the metal sector and 107 percent in
the banking sector. A Danish study (Ministry of Finance 1998) on the strictness of
eligibility criteria in 19 OECD countries concluded that strict benefit eligibility
criteria can reduce long-term unemployment and offset the impact of high re-
placement rates in countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden.
43. However, as noted in Martin and Grubb (2001) the preprogram or motivation ef-
fects of potential referral to such programs can be significant. For example, in
U.S. welfare reform, the decline in entries to welfare has been as important as the
increase in exits from welfare in accounting for the caseload declines (Moffitt
2002). Beyond the United States, public employment programs with emphasis on
training have often been a component in strategies where motivation effects play
an important role (e.g., the New Deal in the United Kingdom or Work for the Dole
in Australia). Moreover, such programs can help severely disadvantaged labor
market groups to stay economically active as part of an overall strategy against
social exclusion (Brodsky 2000).
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